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CHAPTER 8: Transparency 
By Leslie Francis, PhD, JD 
 
Transparency is one of the key concepts of privacy protection. Transparency means openness 
about data collection, use, and retention. Individuals need to know what information about 
them is being collected, how it is being collected, how it is to be used and shared, how it is 
protected, what has been learned from data use, how what has been learned might benefit 
them, and how they can seek correction or redress for security breaches or other unjustified 
uses or disclosures of data. This chapter begins with a highly salient recent example of 
transparency in action: the principled commitment to transparency in the precision medicine 
initiative (PMI) and the limited extent to which it has been developed in the initiative to date. 
The chapter then provides an overview of justifications for transparency and challenges 
inherent in providing consumers with understanding that is meaningful to them. The chapter 
then considers methods for achieving transparency through publication or notice and what is 
known about the success or failure of these methods. For example, privacy notices have 
grown bloated and legalistic; patients rarely read them and if they do, they do not understand 
them. The chapter concludes with a discussion of emerging solutions. 
 
The Principle Of Transparency In The Precision Medicine Initiative 
 
The precision medicine initiative is a highly ambitious effort to create a cohort of over a 
million volunteers who agree to contribute their health data over many years to further 
investigation of the molecular, environmental, and behavioral aspects of disease. Led by the 
National Institutes of Health (NIH), it aims to develop an understanding of important 
variations among patients that will enable targeting therapeutic or other interventions to 
maximize success in treatment and prevention of disease. It also aims to create new models 
for patient engagement not only in care but also in research. And the plan is to try to 
maximize diversity within the cohort so that individuals of different types are not left behind 
in the advantages that the PMI may bring. The information collected about cohort participants 
will be vast and various: blood and possible other tissue samples, information from electronic 
health records (EHRs), a baseline physical exam, insurance claims, mobile health devices, 
participant surveys, and other sources. And cohort participants will be expected to agree to be 
re-contacted over time to participate in a variety of more specific research studies.1 
 
As thus envisioned, the PMI presents difficult questions of transparency. Participants in the 
cohort will vary in location, age, language and culture, race, socioeconomic status, and many 
other factors. As individuals are enrolled in the cohort, there will be an overall promise of 
what it may achieve but no precise information about how the data will be used, how 
frequently individuals will be re-contacted, what studies will be of interest, how long the data 
will be valuable, whether other data will be needed and combined with the types of data 
sought initially, and what will ultimately be learned. Any consent at enrollment therefore 
must perforce be highly general, based on whatever parameters can reasonably be anticipated. 
But these parameters may change as more is learned. Transparency thus will involve not only 
information at a single time slice, but information over time as the uses of the cohort change 
and results emerge.  
 
The initial White House announcement of privacy and trust principles for the PMI included 
transparency as a guiding principle necessary to building trust among participants in the 
                                                
1 Precision Medicine Initiative Working Group. 2015. The Precision Medicine Initiative 
Cohort  Program – Building a Research Foundation for 21st Century Medicine (Sept. 17) 
https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working-group-
report-20150917-2.pdf, Executive Summary, pp. 1-5. 
program and more generally in society as well. The principle of transparency was fleshed out 
into five areas, as follows: 
Transparency  
 1. A dynamic information-sharing process should be developed to ensure 
all PMI participants remain adequately informed through all stages of 
participation. Communications should be culturally appropriate and use 
languages reflective of the diversity of the participants.  
 2. Information should be communicated to participants clearly and 
conspicuously concerning: how, when, and what information and specimens 
will be collected and stored; generally how their data will be used, accessed, 
and shared; types of studies for which the individual’s data may be used; the 
goals, potential benefits, and risks of participation, including risks of 
inappropriate use or compromise of the information about participants; the 
privacy and security measures that are in place to protect participant data, 
including notification plans in the event of a breach; and the participant’s 
ability to withdraw from the cohort at any time, with the understanding that 
consent for research use of data included in aggregate data sets or used in past 
studies and studies already begun cannot be withdrawn.  
 3. Information should be made publicly available concerning PMI data 
protections and use, and compliance with governance rules.  
 4. Participants should be notified promptly following discovery of a breach 
of their personal information. Notification should include, to the extent 
possible, a description of the types of information involved in the breach; steps 
individuals should take to protect themselves from potential harm, if any; and 
steps being taken to investigate the breach, mitigate losses, and protect against 
further breaches.  
 5. All users of PMI data should be expected to publish or publicly post a 
summary of their research findings, regardless of the outcomes, as a condition 
of data use. To enrich the public data resource, mechanisms for data users to 
integrate their research findings back into PMI should be developed.2 
 
These are impressive transparency goals. Putting them into practice will not be easy. The 
NIH working group report on building the PMI cohort, for example, references transparency 
only three times, and one of these is to mention the White House announcement. The other 
two references emphasize the return of their own data to participants; what this means is not 
further explained, but perhaps the goal is to highlight the patient engagement aspects of the 
PMI. The references do not as yet elaborate other aspects of transparency, such as how to 
communicate what is being done with information collected for the PMI or what investigators 
will be expected to do in sharing research results with participants and the public more 
generally. In the first reference to transparency, in th final sentence of the Executive 
Summary, the working group states that “Transparency regarding data access and use will be 
emphasized, with return of information to participants, including aggregate data and return of 
participant’s personal data as desired.”3 And in second reference, in the discussion of data 
access, use, and analysis, the working group notes, “In the spirit of transparency and 
collaboration, individuals and organizations that provide data to the PMI cohort should, as a 
general policy, have unrestricted rights of access to their own submitted data. Individual 
                                                
2White House. 2015. Precision Medicine Initiative: Privacy and Trust Principles (Nov. 9). 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/finalpmiprivacyandtrustprinciples.p
df, pp. 2-3.  
3Precision Medicine Initiative Working Group. 2015. The Precision Medicine Initiative 
Cohort  Program – Building a Research Foundation for 21st Century Medicine (Sept. 17) 
https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working-group-
report-20150917-2.pdf, p. 79.  
participants will have varying levels of health and science literacy, and will need assistance 
with interpretation of their data.”4  
 
These references are the only elaborations of transparency by the NIH working group. 
Clearly, much more will need to be said about transparency as the PMI is developed.  More 
needs to be said about transparency for other emerging uses of information as well. 
 
Transparency: Its Meaning, Justifications, And Means 
 
Transparency has long been a cornerstone value in the management of information about 
individuals. What are called Fair Information Practices (FIPs) were first proposed in a 1973 
report5 of the then-Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The report, Records, 
Computers, and the Rights of Citizens,6 stipulated that there should be no data collection 
systems whose existence was secret. Many subsequent formulations of FIPs have fleshed this 
out to include aspects of data collection: people should be able to know what data about them 
are being collected, who (or what) is collecting the data, how the data are being collected, and 
how the data are being stored, disclosed, managed, and used. Understanding what the quite 
abstract idea of transparency means in different data contexts is challenging, however, and 
turning briefly to justifications for transparency is useful in this regard. 
                                                
4 Precision Medicine Initiative Working Group. 2015. The Precision Medicine Initiative 
Cohort  Program – Building a Research Foundation for 21st Century Medicine (Sept. 17) 
https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives/pmi/pmi-working-group-
report-20150917-2.pdf, p. 20. 
5 For a very useful history of FIPs, see Gellman R. Fair Information Practices: A Basic 
History, version 2.16; June 17, 2016. Available at: http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-
FIPShistory.pdf. 
6 Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, 




Justifications for transparency may be rooted in the obligations of the entity collecting the 
data, the rights of individuals, or contracts between the data collector and the individual. 
Myriad types of entities today are involved in data collection activities: with respect to health 
data, these include international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, 
governments (i.e., public health agencies), healthcare organizations, Internet search 
providers, newspapers, data brokers, other commercial entities, and most recently in the US 
the PMI—to name just a few. These data collectors may have very different rights and 
obligations. Governments—at least, democratic governments—are generally thought to have 
ethical obligations to their citizens to be open about what they are doing and about what they 
are learning, unless there are overriding reasons for information protection.7 These 
obligations may be especially strong if matters of public interest or public safety are 
involved, and may be overridden in exceptional cases, such as individual privacy, law 
enforcement or national security, or commercial secrecy. Freedom of information laws and 
their exceptions reflect these commitments.8 Commercial entities that assemble and market 
databases may assert intellectual property rights through copyright9 or trade secrets law to 
these assets, as appears to be happening increasingly in the wake of court decisions limiting 
patent rights of genetic testing companies.10 However, these intellectual property rights may 
                                                
7 Pozen DE. Deep Secrecy. Stanford Law Review. 2010;62:275-339. 
8 The federal Freedom of Information Act is 5 U.S.C. § 552; 2016. 
9 Asserting a copyright requires an element of creativity; mere listings of information such as 
material gathered from patient records would not be copyrightable, absent more. Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services Co., 499 U.S. 340; 1991 (telephone white 
pages listings not copyrightable). There has been considerable controversy regarding when 
databases are copyrightable, e.g., Bitton M, A New Outlook on the Economic Dimension of 
the Database Protection Debate. IDEA. 2006; 47:93-169. 
10 Trade secrets law requires the entity asserting this intellectual property right to make 
reasonable efforts to keep the information from being disclosed. Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
(1985) § 1(4)(ii). This law thus works very differently from patent law, which requires 
disclosure of the invention as a condition for asserting exclusivity. Companies with large data 
bases of patient information may claim these as trade secrets to gain competitive advantage—
be limited or overridden by public interests, such as public health or safety.11 
 
Although understood in multiple forms, the individual right to privacy has been legally 
recognized for more than 100 years.12 This right has been interpreted as rights to control 
access to the person, as rights to protection against intrusion into secluded space, as rights to 
control information, and as rights to make decisions about important or intimate matters, 
among other conceptualizations. The right to privacy also has been distinguished from the 
right to confidentiality: the right to control access to and disclosure of information about 
oneself.13 Data collection, use, or disclosure may implicate both privacy and confidentiality 
as thus understood. 
 
Many values have been asserted in support of these multiple understandings of privacy and 
confidentiality rights. These values include autonomy and choice, political liberty, physical 
security, intimacy, dignity, identity, equality, and justice. Some of these values relate directly 
to the individual, such as the ability to make choices about one’s life. Understanding what 
information is being collected can help individuals make choices about what information to 
share, whom to trust with that information, and whether to rely upon their expectations about 
what will happen to their information. Knowing what information has been collected, who 
has done the collecting, and whether the information has been disclosed to others can also 
                                                                                                                                                  
for example, a genetic testing company may have information about the significance of 
variants that is not generally available. See e.g. Cook-Deegan R, Conley JM, Evans JP, 
Vorhaus D. The next controversy in genetic testing: clinical data as trade secrets? Eur J Hum 
Genet. 2013; 21(6):585-8. 
11 Lyndon ML. Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering 
Information Privileges in Environmental, Health, and Safety Law. University of Colorado 
Law Review. 2007; 78:465-531. 
12 Warren S, Brandeis LD. The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review. 1890; 4(5):193-220; 
Prosser WL. Privacy. California Law Review. 1960; 48(3):383-423. 
13 Francis LP, Privacy and Confidentiality: the Importance of Context. Monist. 2008; 
91(1):52-67. 
help individuals to be aware of, and thus hopefully protect themselves against information 
disclosures, such as those that might occur through a security breach. Some of these values 
may also be asserted on the level of a group: information about group members or about the 
group itself may lead to the group being targeted for attack (even genocide), may alter 
conceptions of group identity, may stigmatize, or may result in discrimination against 
members of the group. 
 
Transparency may also be useful for the data collector. People may be more willing to share 
information—thus contributing to more robust data collection possibilities if they believe 
they can trust data collectors.14 Notorious examples highlight how mistrust about data 
collection and use can harm data collection abilities. In Texas15 and in Minnesota,16 failures 
to inform the public about retention and subsequent uses of blood spots obtained in newborn 
screening programs resulted in public outcry and the eventual destruction of valuable public 
health resources and the data they contained. Arizona State University settled with the 
Havasupai tribe after researchers had used genetic data obtained in a study of diabetes and 
then de-identified it for research studies of mental illness and migration patterns.17 Multiple 
studies sound the theme that consumer concerns about the privacy of their health information 
may generate reluctance to use patient portals, HIEs, or PHR systems.18 Although searching 
                                                
14 Froomkin AM. A New Legal Paradigm? The Death of Privacy? Stanford Law Review. 
2000; 52:1461 1543. 
15 Texas Department of State Health Services, Statement: Newborn Screening Settlement; 
December 22, 2009. Available at: www.dshs.state.tx.us/news/releases/20091222.shtm. 
16 Minnesota Department of Health. Minnesota Department of Health to begin destroying 
newborn blood spots in order to comply with recent Minnesota Supreme Court ruling; 
January 31, 2012. Available at: 
www.health.state.mn.us/news/pressrel/2012/newborn013112.html. 
17 Harmon A. Indian tribe wins fight to limit research of its DNA. The New York Times. April 
21, 2010. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?pagewanted=all. 
18 For example: California HealthCare Foundation. Achieving the Right Balance: Privacy and 
Security Policies to Support Electronic Health Information Exchange; March 2012. 
Available at: http://www.chcf.org/publications/2012/06/achieving-right-balance. 
for health information is a common Internet activity,19 recent data also indicates that 
willingness to share information depends on perceived tradeoffs between risks and what is to 
be gained.20 
 
Most generally, transparency refers to openness about what is being done. In contemporary 
statements of FIPs, this general idea of transparency has taken two importantly different 
forms: general publication and direct-to-consumer notice. As an example of the former, the 
U.S. Privacy Act requires that federal agencies publish notice in the Federal Register of the 
existence and character of the systems of records they maintain.21 Another example of 
general publication would be the suggestion of the FTC to data brokers—entities that collect 
and aggregate data for resale—to develop a website register of data collection activities for 
marketing purposes to allow consumers to understand what they are doing, know their access 
and choice rights, and opt out of uses of information about them.22  
 
A second type of effort to ensure transparency is giving direct notice to the consumer. This 
has taken many different forms. Early in their development, FIPs were interpreted to require 
direct notice to individuals about specific disclosures. For example, the U.S. Privacy Act 
requires that federal agencies make reasonable efforts to provide notice of disclosures made 
                                                
19 The latest available data from the Pew Internet Project indicates that 87% of US adults 
used the internet in 2012, and that 72% of these internet users had searched for health 
information during that year. Pew Research Center. Health Fact Sheet; Dec. 16, 2013. 
Available at: http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/health-fact-sheet/. 
20 Rainie L Duggan M. Privacy and Information Sharing; January 14, 2016. Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/01/14/privacy-and-information-sharing/. 
21 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4);2016. 
22 Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: 
Recommendations for Business and Policymakers; March 2012; page 69. Available at: 
www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. Although this suggestion was made in 
2012, it does not appear to have been acted on as of 2016. 
under compulsory legal process when the disclosure will become a matter of public record.23 
Notification of security breaches of PHI is required by the HITECH Act amendments24 to 
HIPAA for covered entities and their business associates, and for vendors of PHRs.25 
Following California’s lead in 2002, most states have also enacted breach notification 
statutes, although the majority of these do not include health information.26 
 
The idea of a notice of privacy practices—either published on a website for readers to use or 
given in paper form to individuals—is a more recent development. As early as 1995, the 
European Union’s Directive 95/46 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data required member states to enact notice standards.27 Under EU 
law, directives give member states flexibility in meeting minimum standards while 
regulations set out requirements for all to meet. In 2016, Directive 95/46 was replaced by the 
General Data Protection Regulation which incorporates and strengthens the requirements of 
the Directive.28  Any collection of personal data requires notice, including the identity and 
contact details of the data controller and data protection officer, the purposes of the data 
collection, the legal basis for the collection, the recipients or categories of recipients of the 
                                                
23 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(8);2016. 
24 HITECH Act §§ 13402, 13407. 
25 HITECH Act § 13407. 
26 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1798.82, 1798.29(2016); National Conference of State Legislatures, 
Security Breach Notification Laws; January 24, 2016. 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-
breach-notification-laws.aspx 
27 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, Art. 10; Official Journal of the European Communities. no.281/31 (23.11.95). Available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf. 
28 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection 
Regulation); Official Journal of the European Union L119/1 (4.5.2016). Available at: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016R0679&from=en. 
data, and any intent of the data controller to transfer data outside of the EU.29 Similar 
information must be provided where personal data have not been obtained from the data 
subject.30 All of this information must be provided “in a concise, transparent, intelligible and 
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language…”31 Further information “necessary to 
ensure fair and transparent processing is also required, including the length of data storage, 
the right to request rectification or erasure of the data, whether the data will be used in 
profiling and any envisioned consequences of this, and whether the data subject is required to 
provide the data along with the consequences of refusal.”32  
 
One major innovation of the Regulation is incorporation of the so-called “right to be 
forgotten,” a right to have data erased under specified circumstances, including that there are 
no longer overriding legitimate grounds for maintaining the data.33 A major motivation for 
the overhaul of EU data protection was the judgment that enforcement of standards for data 
transfer outside of the EU had become too lenient, especially for transfers to the US. In July, 
2016, the EU and the US finalized a Privacy Shield Framework so that data can be 
transferred back and forth between the two; the framework contains significantly stronger 
requirements and enforcement guarantees than the prior Safe Harbor arrangement.34 Among 
the new requirements for Privacy Shield participants are compliance with EU notice and 
choice requirements and transparency regarding any enforcement actions against the 
participant.35 The Privacy Shield Framework will likely result in increased transparency and 
                                                
29 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 13. 
30 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 14. 
31 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 12(1). 
32 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 13(2), Art. 14(2). 
33 Regulation (EU) 2016/679, Art. 17. 
34 U.S. Department of Commerce, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Program Overview; July 2016. 
Available at: https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview . 
35 U.S. Department of Commerce, EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework Key New 
Requirements of Participating Companies. Available at: https://www.privacyshield.gov/Key-
stiffer notice requirements for companies seeking to transfer data from the EU. 
 
Other federal and state laws also require privacy notices. Federally, the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999 (otherwise known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley) requires financial 
institutions and insurance companies to send their customers conspicuous yearly notices 
explaining their policies with respect to information protection and disclosure.36 Without the 
notice and information about how to opt out, these institutions may not disclose identifiable 
personal information to unrelated entities.37 California state law requires a privacy notice to 
be included in a conspicuous manner on any commercial website collecting personally 
identifiable information about consumers.38 
 
With respect to health information specifically, the HIPAA Privacy Rule requires covered 
entities to provide patients with an NPP. The HIPAA NPP must include prescribed language, 
in all capital letters, calling the reader’s attention to what the notice concerns. Prescribed 
information includes a description of the types of uses and disclosures that are permitted 
without individual authorization, a statement that other uses and disclosures may occur with 
authorization, and separate statements about certain uses and disclosures, such as for 
fundraising. The NPP must also tell the individual about their rights of access to health 
information, rights to an accounting of uses and disclosures, and rights to request 
amendments.39 The notice also requires contact information and information about how to 
file complaints. It is fair to say that the HIPAA regulation is prescriptive and complex, and 
                                                                                                                                                  
New-Requirements . 
36 15 U.S.C. § 6803; 2016. 
37 15 U.S.C. § 6802; 2016. 
38 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §22577; 2016. 
39 45 CFR §164.520; 2016. 
 
encourages lengthy and formalistic notices. 
 
Over the past decade or more, privacy notices and statements of privacy policies have 
become a standard practice across the Internet. Many of these notices also feature a 
notice/choice format in which consumers are invited to make particular choices. Consumers 
may be asked to click “I agree,” thus potentially becoming contractually bound to the 
contents of the notice. Or, they might be told that their data will be used in specified ways 
unless they opt out, and are offered a method for exercising this choice. For particularly 
controversial types of data use, such as marketing, consumers may be told that they must opt 
in to have their data used in this way and offered a “yes” button or some other mechanism of 
acceptance. 
 
Understanding what these privacy notices should be like, what they should say, and what they 
can be expected to achieve has evolved as well. This chapter returns to these developments 
after reviewing widely understood challenges to successful transparency. 
 
Transparency: Barriers To Achieving Successful Communication 
 
Understood passively, transparency is not difficult to attain. Information about data collection 
activities can be published and individuals can be handed or mailed notices about these 
practices. If transparency is understood in terms of its justifications however, passive 
publication is not enough. Openness on the part of government requires more than lists buried 
in the Federal Register or some other publicly-accessible document; it requires education of 
and interaction with the public so that at least a reasonable proportion has sufficient 
understanding to exercise any rights they might have and to participate in the political process 
with respect to information-gathering by their governments. A notice/choice model with 
respect to information uses and disclosures does not succeed in respecting individual 
autonomy unless individuals have sufficient understanding and opportunities to make 
meaningful choices. Thus understood, transparency requires at least some success in 
communicating. It is an ongoing process and its achievement is a matter of degree. But there 
are significant barriers to achieving transparency in this sense. The issues themselves are 
complex and answers are not easy. 
 
First, individuals are not ideal recipients of communication, to say the least. In the 
background are variations in literacy, access to media, Internet familiarity, time and energy, 
cognitive biases, and cultural practices and attitudes. Commentators lament a “digital 
divide”40 between those who have ready and skilled access to the Internet and those who do 
not, largely the poor, racial minorities, and rural populations, especially in the Southeast.41  
The advent of widespread smartphone use may be mitigating this divide, but in a manner that 
brings additional challenges associated with smartphone privacy, such as lack of password 
protection, lack of data encryption, or ease of loss. Demographically, at least in general, the 
elderly may have less familiarity with and understanding of technology and the Internet. 
Many internet users are now very concerned about privacy but do not know a great deal about 
mechanisms they might use to protect it.42 Also according to this study, people who are new 
to the internet are more likely to need help to figure out how to use features of websites that 
                                                
40 Council of Economic Advisers Issue Brief. Mapping the Digital Divide; July 2015. 
Available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/wh_digital_divide_issue_brief.pdf. 
41 Lee Rainie. Digital Divide 2016; July 14, 2016, slide 30. Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/07/14/digital-divides-2016/. 
42 Lee Rainie. Digital Divides 2016; July 14, 2016, slide 41. Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/07/14/digital-divides-2016/. 
enable them to protect information.43  
 
With respect to privacy, social scientists have identified a so-called “privacy paradox.”44 
Although individuals say that they value privacy, they do not act as though they do. Failure to 
search or to read privacy notices may exemplify this paradox.45 Some economists and social 
commentators draw the conclusion that actions speak more loudly than words, and 
individuals’ failures to protect their privacy may simply reveal that they do not value it very 
much and that privacy protection is therefore inefficient.46 In a much-quoted remark, Scott 
McNealy, then-CEO of Sun Microsystems, opined: “You have zero privacy anyway. Get 
over it!”47 On the other hand, there may be significant variations in the extent to which 
people value privacy, to some extent correlated with age cohort. People also may value 
privacy less if they believe that they will get important benefits from sharing their 
information—through social networking sites, such as Facebook, or through network sites 
that share information about health conditions, such as PatientsLikeMe. Additionally, 
individuals may lack understanding of what privacy policies and law actually provide to 
them. One study suggests that misconceptions are widespread, especially in younger age 
cohorts; many people believe that having a privacy policy is the same as protecting privacy 
(it is not; a policy must simply state what protections exist, if any) and that they have rights to 
sue for damages if their privacy is violated (in general, they do not).48 This confidence, based 
                                                
43 Lee Rainie. Digital Divides 2016; July 14, 2016, slide 40. Available at: 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/07/14/digital-divides-2016/. 
44 Nordberg PA, Horne DR, Horne DA. The privacy paradox: personal information disclosure 
intentions vs. behaviors. Journal of Consumer Affairs. 2007; 41(1):100-126. 
45 Groom V, Calo MR. Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An Experimental Study. Available at: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993125. 
46 Posner RA. The Right of Privacy. Georgia Law Review. 1978; 12(3):393-422. 
47 Sprenger P. Sun on Privacy: ‘Get Over it! Wired. January 26, 1999. Available at: 
www.wired.com/politics/law/news/1999/01/17538. 
48 Hoofnagle C, King J, Li S, Turow J. How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults 
When It Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes & Policies; April 14, 2010. Available at: 
in misunderstanding, may explain why many people fail to read privacy notices. Other 
explanations include the length and difficulty of many privacy notices—as well as the fact 
that they may appear legalistic and boring. 
 
Several studies have discerned cognitive biases as playing a major role in apparently 
paradoxical behavior about privacy, arguing that these biases can help explain what seems 
paradoxical. For example, increasing perceived control over publication of private 
information may increase willingness to disclose, even when the increase in perceived control 
is coupled with reduced protection of the information from access by others . This is a 
paradox of perceived control and risky behavior: the greater the perceived control, the greater 
the likelihood of risk-taking, with the perverse result of worse outcomes.49 A further 
complexity is that differences in perceived relative risk—how much greater the risk of one 
alternative is in comparison to another—may be more influential on individual behavior in 
actual circumstances than differences in absolute risk.50 (Adjerid, Peer and Acquisti 2016). 
Thus a change in a privacy notice about a decreased level of protection may be more 
impactful on individual privacy behavior than lack of notice in the first place. Another 
illustration of this irrationality is the status quo bias and default settings: consumers are much 
less likely to change default privacy settings, even when they do not reflect their actual 
preferences. Policy makers are beginning to consider how to take these factors into account in 
designs of websites and their privacy policies, as a conference series at the US Federal Trade 
Commission called PrivacyCon illustrates.51 
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Second, data collectors—whether public or private—may have legitimate reasons for caution 
about transparency requirements. Data collectors may be concerned that if they reveal the 
information that they have or what they are doing with it, they may be less able to protect it. 
They may find themselves overwhelmed with requests for the data—or worse, subject to 
criminally-motivated attacks now that they have been identified as a likely target. They may 
be concerned that knowledge of their activities will lead to public objections or protest, or 
may generate litigation. Revealing the kinds of information they possess to competitors may 
diminish competitive advantages resulting from careful (and expensive) investments in data. 
Finally, transparency—at least of the sort designed to generate real understanding—takes 
time and may be expensive. For example, healthcare providers who work under significant 
time pressures may believe that the time they might spend on explaining a privacy notice 
could be far better spent on explaining patients’ conditions or treatment alternatives. 
 
On the other hand, both individuals and data collectors may act in ways that cannot be 
justified with respect to transparency. Individuals may be careless, lazy, or inattentive; they 
may not behave as responsible, rational consumers. Data collectors, too, may have 
problematic reasons for transparency reluctance. They may believe that consumers will be 
unwilling to share data if they become better informed about what will happen to it. They 
may wish to use data in ways that many people find objectionable—for example, for 
marketing. They may wish to use data in ways that violate individuals’ moral—or even 
legal—rights (for example, to dismiss an employee in violation of anti-discrimination laws). 
 
Efforts to achieve transparency must contend with both legitimate barriers and unjustifiable 
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reasons for failure. The next section considers notice and choice as an instructive model for 
efforts to achieve transparency. 
 
Notice As A Method For Achieving Transparency 
 
As explained above, the idea of a privacy notice came into being relatively recently as a 
means for informing consumers about data collection activities. Privacy statements have 
become standard fare in the bottom margins of websites, waiting to be clicked on by 
interested consumers. These notices are frequently long, written in language that may appear 
reassuring, but actually convey little information to the average consumer, and designed to 
protect companies from liability. 
 
The notice/choice model is rooted in a specific vision of autonomy. The idea is that if 
individuals are told what will happen to the data (given notice), they will then be able to 
make choices about what data they are willing to share, with whom, and for what purposes. 
In its most passive form, notice/choice simply tells a consumer that particular activities—use 
of a website, for example—constitutes consent to the privacy practices. If people do not read 
notices, however, it is questionable whether their activities constitute genuine consent. 
Somewhat more active notice/choice models require individuals to signify agreement (an “I 
agree” or “I accept” hot button), possibly after actually opening a privacy notice. Although 
these models leave evidence of a statement of agreement and have been used in court to limit 
companies’ contractual obligations to customers,52 they do little to ensure that individuals 
actually read the notices or are informed about the content to which they are agreeing. Even 
so, they do remain available for consumers to examine at a later time. These notices also 
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provide a statement of privacy practices that put a data collector on record about policies and 
establish rules for their employees.53 Failure to adhere to a stated privacy policy is an unfair 
trade practice in that it may mislead the consumer and may subject the entity to an 
enforcement action by the FTC. Additional defenses of these limited notice/choice models 
could contend that individuals’ failure to read notices signifies that privacy is not very salient 
to them or that individuals are responsible for what they allow to happen with information 
about them. 
 
More granular notice/choice models permit or require individuals to agree to particular data 
practices. A privacy notice might offer individuals a menu of data uses, inviting them to opt 
out if they so wish. Such opt-out approaches leave data use or disclosure as the default, and 
there is evidence that many individuals leave default settings in place even if they do not 
reflect their preferences in fine-grained fashion.54 Some notice/choice models, especially for 
sensitive data or controversial uses, require specific opt-in. Here, the default setting is that 
information will not be used or disclosed, and evidence suggests that some individuals do not 
opt in even when they would prefer the data practice in question. In the attempt to avoid such 
problems with default settings, another notice/choice model asks “yes/no” questions for 
particular types of uses or disclosures. These structures are more cumbersome, but it is 
arguable that they provide a better reflection of actual consumer preferences. 
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Designing notices to reflect actual choice raises a number of issues in addition to granularity. 
Explaining complex matters at a reading level most people can understand is one challenge. 
Another question is whether there should be a standardized format used by all notices to 
facilitate consumer comparison. Another is timing: whether the consumer should be 
presented actively with the notice at the particular point at which data are being used or 
disclosed, or whether it is sufficient to provide consumers with a notice only at the time of 
original collection. 
 
Recognizing difficulties with respect to communicating through notices, the FTC has 
proposed “flexible” notice requirements.55 In general, the FTC urges, privacy notices should 
be shorter, more clearly written, and more standardized to facilitate consumer understanding. 
Any notice and choice requirements should be tailored to the purpose and sensitivity of the 
transaction at hand. For some activities—for example, ordering commonly-used consumer 
products over the Internet—notice may be very simple. If practices are consistent with the 
context of the transaction or the relationship between the company and the consumer, or if 
data collection is required by law, the FTC’s judgment is that this simple notice and no 
further consumer choice is all that is required. For other transactions—for example, entering 
health information into a website designed for individuals with serious medical conditions— 
direct notice and choice at the time of entry are required. The FTC Report opts for an 
objective “context of the interaction” standard for consumer choice, in contrast to either a 
subjective standard of consumer expectations or a list of “commonly accepted” practices not 
requiring choice, in order to allow for innovation and the development of new business 
models. “First-party marketing”—such as follow-up service notifications from a dealership 
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from which the customer has purchased an automobile—would not require consumer choice 
but tracking across other websites would do so. “Data enhancement” activities—adding third-
party data to data collected from the consumer—would also not require choice. 
 
In reaching these conclusions about flexible notice requirements, the FTC assumes a 
background of what it calls “privacy by design.” This means that appropriate levels of 
privacy protection are built into all data collection activities. For example, third parties that 
are the sources of data sets used for enrichment are assumed to have built appropriate privacy 
practices into their collection as well, so that all the data used for enrichment has been subject 
to whatever notice and consent is appropriate for that data and use. To the end of achieving 
privacy by design, the White House discussion draft of a consumer privacy bill of rights 
included industry-specific codes. Compliance with these codes, the discussion draft 
suggested, could serve as a safe harbor from FTC enforcement actions.56 Whether such self-
regulatory efforts are likely to achieve progress in transparency remains to be seen.57 
 
Case Study: Onc’s Model PHR Privacy Notice And Beyond 
 
Personal health records (PHRs), in many ways eclipsed today, are one vehicle for data 
collection in which the use of privacy notices has been explored extensively. PHRs allow 
individuals to create, develop, and control information about their health. At one point, they 
were thought to be an excellent way to involve consumers in their health care, although they 
appear to have been largely supplanted by other methods such as internet apps or wearable 
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devices. Evaluations suggested that PHRs were simply too complex for many intended 
users.58 Many of the PHRs remaining in use are linked to EHRs maintained by healthcare 
providers; these PHRs are typically structured so that the information in them is protected by 
HIPAA and subject to HIPAA notice requirements. Some PHRs, however, are freestanding 
and may contain health information that has been uploaded by the patient or downloaded 
from HIPAA-protected entities, but the information in them is not subject to HIPAA because 
these freestanding PHRs are not HIPAA-covered entities. The vast explosion of internet apps 
and wearable devices for collecting health information also has taken place largely outside of 
the realm of HIPAA protection, except for those devices that are directly linked to patients’ 
medical records. The development of PHRs and later methods of health data collection thus 
provide an instructive case study for analyzing issues raised by reliance on notices as a 
method for achieving transparency. 
 
 In 2008, ONC began a process of developing a model PHR notice for PHR vendors to use, a 
process culminating in September 2011 with release of a voluntary model notice. The 
project’s goals were to increase consumer awareness and provide consumers with an easy 
method for comparing the practices of different PHR vendors.59 ONC’s background 
statement judged that the model notice should help vendors be transparent about their privacy 
and security policies, generate trust in PHRs, and compete on the extent to which their 
policies protect consumers.60 ONC’s model notice was not designed to tell vendors what 
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choices they should offer consumers or whether to provide additional information to meet 
legal requirements applicable in their jurisdictions. Instead, with transparency as the goal, the 
model notice was developed based on consumer testing and research involving cognitive 
usability and provided a standard template for insertion of “yes/no” answers into pre-set 
fields. 
 
The template was titled “What are [company name] PHR data practices?”61 It covered two 
topics: data release and security. “Release” questions asked whether data would be released 
for marketing and advertising, medical and pharmaceutical research, reporting about the 
company and customer activity, insurers and employers, and developing software 
applications—in each case as either personally identifiable or statistical forms. For 
“security,” the questions were whether data are stored in the United States only and whether 
activity logs are kept for customer review. The template also encouraged vendors to add a 
“hot button” at the end for individuals to click on to access the vendor’s complete privacy and 
security policies. 
 
An earlier edition of this chapter reported significant problems with PHR privacy notices ten 
months after ONC published its voluntary model privacy notice.62 Notices were long and had 
an average reading level of 14.54, with a low of 12.44 and a high of 18.02, making it quite 
unlikely that the notices would be accessible by the many Americans without college degrees. 
By contrast, the  National Cancer Institute recommends a eighth grade reading level for 







62 Cite to 1st edition. 
informed consent forms used for patients in research studies.63 Several notices included 
explicit statements that the policy limited their liability to the consumer; these policies could 
be characterized as company-protective rather than consumer-informative. Many policies 
indicated that they would disclose information in response to requests by law enforcement or 
government agencies such as Homeland Security and only one indicated that the site would 
attempt to notify the consumer before disclosing the information. Because these disclosures 
might adversely affect consumers’ legal rights, privacy advocates have been especially 
concerned that PHR vendors should at least inform consumers in order to give them an 
opportunity to object.64 Many notices reserved the right to change privacy policies, in some 
cases without directly informing the consumer. A few indicated that consumers could delete 
information or terminate accounts, but others were silent about consumers’ rights in this 
regard. 
 
PHRs have been largely supplanted in the market by internet apps for tracking various health 
measures such as diet or weight, and by wearable technologies such as fitness trackers. 
Because these mechanisms are outside of HIPAA protections, concerns about privacy 
protection have been significant. In 2016, ONC embarked on an update of its model privacy 
notice aimed at these mechanisms.65 It solicited comments and received thirteen comments 
representing broad coalitions of stakeholders. A search of these comments revealed frequent 
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statements about the importance of transparency and a few suggestions of how that might be 
achieved. The following table summarizes these results: 



























These results indicate a commitment to transparency but less discussion of what transparency 
actually means or how it can be achieved. Perhaps the explanation is that the comments were 
submitted in response to ONC’s request to answer other specific questions regarding updating 
model privacy notices for PHRs. Nonetheless, only two—CDT and patientprivacyrights—
refer to difficulties in achieving communication of data uses in real time to consumers. Many 
do indicate the importance of sharing types of uses with consumers, including the company’s 
own planned uses and uses of de-identified information. All approve of ONC’s plan to extend 
the voluntary model privacy notice to entities beyond PHR vendors; the AMA is perhaps the 
most forceful in stating that these entities should be moved towards the standards applicable 
to physicians because of the sensitivity of the health information they possess. Other 
commentators such as the Consumer Technology Association would give app developers a 
great deal of flexibility in how they communicate with consumers about what will be done 
with information. Achieving transparency for consumers over the life cycle of information 
use remains a challenge; this is a challenge that will surely need to be addressed as the PMI 
and other novel uses of large data sets evolve.  
BEYOND POSTED NOTICES: PRESCRIBED PRODUCT LABELS AND OTHER 
TECHNIQUES FOR INFORMING CONSUMERS 
 
This section considers several additional methods for attempting to achieve transparency. 
Product labels have become a common method of conveying information to consumers. They 
have the advantage of appearing every time the consumer purchases a product and, if they are 
noticeably affixed to the product, every time it is used. Nutritional labeling is one example. 
Statutory authority regarding nutrition labels is drawn from the Nutrition Labeling and 
Education Act of 1990,78 thus enabling the FDA to prescribe their form and content by 
regulation. Current labels list information about calories, fat content, vitamins, and minerals 
as a percentage of daily requirements. The amounts are listed per serving, with an indication 
of how many servings are in a package; consumers reading only the amounts may fail to 
recognize that a package contains several servings. The UK by contrast uses a “traffic light” 
system that indicates by red, yellow, or green whether a food is “high,” “medium,” or “low” 
in comparison to recommended daily allowances. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) requires restaurants with more than 20 locations nationally to provide calorie 
labels for standard menu items.79 Another familiar product label required by statute is the 
gasoline miles per gallon (mpg) disclosure for automobiles.80 Further illustrations can be 
found in the many disclosure requirements that apply to lending, securities transactions, 
insurance, and other financial transactions. This use of disclosure as a substitute for 
regulation gained traction in the Reagan administration and has been a standard proposal of 
critics of government regulation ever since.8155 
 
Some research has addressed the efficacy of nutrition labels and attempted to apply the model 
to privacy policies. A group at Carnegie Mellon found that although consumers would like 
more information in the labels, they might actually be confused by it.82 The Carnegie Mellon 
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group’s research also indicated that nutrition labels do have a small effect on consumer 
behavior, especially for consumers who are already interested in the information because they 
are trying to control their weight. 
 
Other research has explored methods for conveying the information in notices. A group at the 
Stanford Center for Internet and Society has explored presentation techniques for 
encouraging consumers to read notices and to make notices more vivid for them.83 An 
experimental study on notice in the context of privacy by these researchers attempted to 
understand whether different formats achieved greater success in influencing people’s actual 
privacy behavior. The researchers hypothesized that “visceral” notice strategies—notice 
strategies with apparent non-cognitive appeal—would achieve superior success in influencing 
how much information people revealed deliberately or inadvertently.84 The researchers 
constructed a website for a supposed new search engine and manipulated several different 
aspects of the website design: the formality of the website; whether the website revealed prior 
search history; whether the website featured interaction with a humanlike representation 
(such as an interface that includes an image of a human face); and whether the website 
revealed information about the user’s current Internet location. The dependent variable of 
interest in this study was the extent to which participants revealed information about 
themselves when selecting questions for Internet searches. One conclusion was that informal 
website design increased the frequency of both direct and unwitting disclosure, probably 
because informality signaled to participants low levels of data collection by the website. 
Another conclusion was that participants were more likely to make unwitting disclosures 
under the notice conditions that prevail on websites today—a privacy policy containing 
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standard notice conditions available for clicking at the bottom of the site. The presence on the 
website of a humanlike representation reduced the likelihood of disclosures. The research 
also concluded that there was no difference between traditional notices and simplified 
versions of these notices in the rates at which participants followed links to privacy policies 
on the website; users simply did not click on the link to the policy at all. 
 
More research on the efficacy of forms of notice and their presentation is clearly needed, 
however, as is research on other forms of disclosure.85 As a former administrator of the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the Office of Management and Budget, Cass 
Sunstein called for further empirical research to assess the efficacy of different kinds of 
disclosure requirements.86 As an example, Sunstein cites the mpg regulation. As originally 
structured, the notice told consumers only the estimated mpg of the vehicle under different 
driving conditions. This structure encouraged consumers to believe that the relationship 
between mpg and gasoline savings is linear, when it is not. Thus consumers erroneously 
assumed that moving from a car burning 10 mpg to a car burning 15 mpg and moving from a 
car burning 25 mpg to a car burning 30 mpg produced equivalent savings. New labels now 
require additional information about gallons/100 miles driven and annual fuel costs that are 
intended to counter this consumer error, but Sunstein does not cite empirical evidence 
concerning the change. 
 
An additional challenge is that these required statutory disclosures have major advantages 
over current model privacy notices. Their statutory foundation allows agencies to issue non-
voluntary regulations, specifying what is to be said and how it is to be presented. They are 
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ubiquitous; consumers see them on the packages of any food, car, or menu and so become 
familiar with them over time. By comparison, use of PHRs never took widespread hold 
among consumers and there is no standardization and often little use of privacy notices 
among newer vehicles collecting health information. Consumers also see nutrition labels, 
menu labels, or mpg disclosures at times when they might be expected to be alert, non-
threatened, and interested in reading them: comparing the prices of food on grocery store 
shelves, shopping for cars, or sitting in a restaurant waiting for a server to take their order. 
And they view readily understandable information about familiar products. 
 
These familiar notices also have advantages over HIPAA privacy notices. Although 
consumers do see HIPAA privacy notices more frequently and so may be more familiar with 
them, to date HHS has not used its regulatory authority to prescribe a common notice form 
like the nutrition label. In addition, consumers are given privacy notices when they access 
healthcare. Unlike shopping or eating in a restaurant, accessing healthcare may be a time of 
stress for patients and their attention is likely to be elsewhere than the privacy notice. 
Moreover, information from these devices and many other sources may be used in a wide 




As described in this chapter, transparency is a goal for collectors and users of data to achieve. 
Transparency as openness about practices cannot be equated with notice and choice models 
for concluding that consumers have consented to data collection or use. Instead, transparency 
must be understood as a process of education, information-communication, and, in 
appropriate circumstances, well informed consumer choice. This process must continue over 
time and cannot simply be a one-off in a privacy notice that consumers may or may not pay 
attention to when they originally agree for their information to be collected. Transparency 
must also be set within a commitment to FIPs more generally. Ongoing study of consumer 
attitudes, communication barriers, and methods for effective information delivery remain 
imperative if individual choice is to be respected. 
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